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I. INTRODUCTION
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which
an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but
the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one,
and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.
Thomas Jefferson1
On September 16, 2011, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) was
signed into law, bringing with it what many consider the most significant change to
the Patent Act since 1952.2 While the Act brings about many changes to the current
patent law system, the most substantial change is the demise of what has been long
seen as the uniquely American approach to patent law—the “first-to-invent” system
of patent priority.3 This bipartisan bill, which effectively switched America’s patent

1. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in
13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 333 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907), available at
https://www.archive.org/stream/writingsofthomas1314jeff#page/n9/mode/2up.
2. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“An Act To
amend title 35, United States Code, to provide for patent reform.”).
3. See id. at § 3; see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa
20XX, A.D., 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 529, 548 n.38 (1998) (“At the end of 1997, there were two nations that
used the so-called first-to-invent system: the United States and the Philippines. Effective January 1, 1998,
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system from “first-to-invent” (FTI) to “first-to-file” (FTF), has created a broad divide in our country, one that transgresses even political party allegiances, between
those who tout the efficiency and global patent harmonization that comes with FTF
and those who strongly oppose FTF, arguing that it is unconstitutional.4
Detractors primarily attack the constitutionality of the FTF system by alleging
that Congress exceeded its mandate when it passed the Act.5 In fact, parties had
already challenged the constitutionality of the AIA during the eighteen-month period before its effective date of March 16, 2013.6 The FTI advocates support their
argument by looking to the history and tradition of United States patent law, which
awards patents to the “first and true inventor.”7 They argue that not only is Congress contravening the long history of U.S. patent law by awarding patents to the
filer, but this would also arguably violate the intent of the framers of the Constitution.8
On the other hand, proponents of FTF interpret the framers’ intent another
way and argue that there is no express language written in the constitution that requires the patent be given to the first inventor, as opposed to any inventor. 9 They
bolster this argument by suggesting that the first-to-file system would actually be
more effective at carrying out the purpose of the patent clause, to grant an incentive
for inventors who promptly file their patent so the public may benefit from the disclosure, by “promot[ing] rapidity of public disclosure.” 10
While there is no doubt that keeping Congress within its mandated powers is
the primary reason for challenging the constitutionality of the AIA, there is also a
very important policy reason to challenge the AIA: the negative impact a weakened
grace period will have on startups, small businesses, and individual inventors. 11
Preventing this negative impact on small businesses and inventors is of the utmost
importance because “[s]mall businesses are the backbone of the U.S. economy[]
and the primary source of jobs for Americans.” 12 The change from first-to-invent to
under its Republic Act No. 8293, the Philippines adopted a first-to-file system, leaving the United States
alone in the world in adhering to a first-to-invent system.”).
4. Under the current U.S. patent priority system, patent rights are awarded to the person who
can show he or she was the first to invent the idea in question regardless of who filed first with the patent
office. Under the first-to-file system, it does not matter who was the first to invent. Rather, whichever
person is fastest in writing an application and submitting it to the patent office gets the patent rights. Doug
Harvey, Reinventing the U.S. Patent System: A Discussion of Patent Reform Through an Analysis of the
Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1133, 1136–37 (2006).
5. Id. at 1143–44.
6.
Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 8:12–cv–1589–T–23MAP,
2013 WL 3155280 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013) (filed July 18, 2012); see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(n), 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011).
7. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790), available at
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Patent_Act_of_1790.pdf (“An act to promote the
progress of useful Arts”) (repealed 1973).
8. Harvey, supra note 4, at 1144.
9. First-to-File v. First-to-Invent: A Bone of Contention in the International Harmonization
of U.S. Patent Law, SHELDON MAK ROSE & ANDERSON,
http://www.usip.com/pdf/Article_Patents/1st2fil.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
10. Id.
11. Jennifer L. Case, How the America Invents Act Hurts American Inventors and Weakens Incentives to Innovate, 82 UMKC L. REV. 29, 72 (2013).
12. Small Business, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/tradetopics/small-business (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
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first-to-file gives large corporations, which have more resources such as in house
counsel and available capital, an advantage because it is easier for a large corporation to file a patent application before an individual inventor, even if the large corporation is not the first inventor.13
This article focuses on the changes the AIA brings to the patent industry and
the effects it will have on small businesses and inventors. In particular, this article
emphasizes how the changes will disadvantage these small entities and advantage
the large corporations. Part II provides a history of patent law in the U.S..14 Specifically, it follows the consistent definition of who is an “inventor” under the U.S.
Constitution.15 Part III compares the language of the current patent system and the
new system under the AIA.16 This analysis is narrowed specifically to language
changing to a first-to-file system and the arguments for and against the switch from
first-to-file.17 Part IV analyzes the harmful effects that the AIA will have on small
companies and inventors regarding the first-to-file provision.18 Finally, Part V will
conclude and suggest ways that small companies and inventors can mitigate the
likely harm they are going to experience. 19
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF U.S. PATENT LAW
A. Constitutional Authority for Awarding Patent Rights
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
United States Constitution.20
By their very nature, ideas, as Thomas Jefferson noted, “freely spread from
one to another . . . incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.” 21 Thus,
because inventions are ideas, they “cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.”22
13. Letter from Todd O. McCracken, President, Nat’l Small Bus. Ass’n to Susy Tsang-Foster,
Legal Advisor, Office of Patent Legal Admin. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Oct. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/nsba_20121005.pdf (“By repealing the invention date as the
priority date, compared to prior art, the AIA will dramatically increase the pressure on small businesses to
establish filing date priority and require them to file more frequently and at every stage of development
without the opportunity to perfect their inventions. The costs of these filings (including the hiring of patent
attorneys, new patenting costs, etc.) and the considerable amount of time involved with more frequent
invention reviews, preparation and related filings will be felt most strongly by the small business community. Large, multinational corporations have the resources to file more applications quicker and earlier in the
development process and will have a disproportionate advantage over their independent and smaller counterparts. The implementation of this rule will deliver a critical blow to small-business patentees and place
them at a significant disadvantage in the patenting process.”).
14. See infra part II.
15. See infra part II.
16. See infra part III.
17. See infra part III.
18. See infra part IV.
19. See infra part V.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21. Jefferson, supra note 1, at 334.
22. Id.
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Therefore, society must set up a system to “give an exclusive right to the profits
arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce
utility” for the benefit of society. 23 While other nations thought that “these monopolies produce more embarrassment than advantage to society,” our founders
thought that this quid pro quo system of exclusive rights in ideas in exchange for
public disclosure was important enough to include in the Constitution.24 Now, the
U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to grant exclusive rights to inventors
for their discoveries.25
Importantly, under this quid pro quo system of awarding patents, the “reward
to the owner [is] a secondary consideration.” 26 Rather, the primary policy reason
for granting patents “is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure.”27 While there is a rich history of legislation and case law
on various aspects of the patent clause, such as what temporal period qualifies as
“limited times,”28 the strand of case law and legislative history this section of the
article is concerned with is the question of who is an “inventor”?
B. Historical Overview on U.S. Patent Law: Who Is an “Inventor”?
Given that historically the inventor has been viewed as first to create, then
such tradition may suggest a constitutionally rooted requirement that
would preclude a first to file system and thus thwart harmonization efforts.
Timothy R. Holbrook29
The beginning of understanding U.S. patent law, understandably, comes from
looking to English patent law at the time of the construction of the U.S. Constitution.30 However, it is the English law’s flaws that inspired America’s patent system.
English common law did not recognize property rights in the mind-work of the
inventor.31 Patents were simply viewed as “a grant” issuing solely from “royal favor” rather than the property in the inventor’s intellectual labor.32 This is commonly referred to as the distinction between a “societal right,” or one given by some
authority, versus a “moral right,” or one earned through mental labor and work.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
27. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (amending the term of patent protection from 17 years to
20 years); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (holding that Congress did not exceed its
mandated power by setting the “limited time” period for copyrights at seventy years).
29. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the
United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 8 (2004) (Timothy Holbrook is an
assistant Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law and this article was presented at the symposium
entitled Patent Law, Social Policy, and Public Interest: The Search for a Balanced Global Patent System,
hosted by the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law).
30. Edward C. Waltershceid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents
(Part 1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697, 699 (1994) (“It is not surprising that the United States
in developing its own law pertaining to property right in invention should look to the law pertaining to the
patent privilege in England.”).
31. McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 418 (1878).
32. Id. at 420.
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While English law applied the “societal right” in patents, the U.S. law, on the contrary, recognizes in the clearest terms the mind-work that we term inventions.33
Thus, this adoption of “moral rights” being grounds for patent issuance and securing to inventors exclusive rights, while founded on English common law, is in
many ways uniquely American.34 As Daniel Webster stated while in the House of
Representatives in 1824, “the right of the inventor” is “the fruit of his mind—it
belongs to him more than any other property—he does not inherit it—he takes it by
no man’s gift—it peculiarly belongs to him, and he ought to be protected in the
enjoyment of it.”35 Moreover, not only did England not give moral rights in patents,
but essentially no other European patent practices or laws were known to those
responsible for creating the first patent law of the U.S.36 Therefore, the framers of
the Constitution created a uniquely American patent law system by rejecting the
common law of England and all of Europe by awarding patent rights to the inventor’s mind-work rather than societal awards to the royally favored.
Not only was the Constitution written to give the inventor rights in patents,
but in 1790, Congress enacted the first patent act, which authorized patents for any
person who “invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine,
or device . . . not before known or used.”37 While Congress amended this Act in
1793, the pertinent language regarding an inventor did not materially change. 38
This language is consistent with the definition of an “invent[o]r” at that time:
“[o]ne who produces something new; a devi[s]er of [s]omething not known before.”39 The language used in these statutes and the understood definition of an
inventor during the drafting of these statutes clearly shows that an inventor must
make a genuine discovery, and not simply win a race to file at the patent office.
Further support regarding what constitutes an inventor can be found in the provision providing for a repeal of a patent if “it shall appear that the patentee was not
the first and true inventor or discoverer.”40 Thus, the language of the original Patent Acts supports the first-to-invent system as the only constitutionally allowed
system in the U. S. because only the first and true inventor can gain patent rights.
While there has been subsequent legislation amending the original Patent
Acts of 1790 and 1793, none of this legislation affected the language that gives
inventors the right to their inventions. 41 In 1836, Congress passed legislation that
reformed patent law by establishing the U.S. Patent Office to review patents instead
33. Id.
34. Walterscheid, supra note 30, at 698.
35. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1824).
36. Walterscheid, supra note 30, at 698.
37. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (emphasis added) (“An Act to promote the
progress of the useful Arts”) (capitalization as in original).
38. Patent Act of 1973, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (“An act to promote the progress of useful
Arts; and to repeal the act heretofore made for that purpose”). The language regarding an inventor simply
changed to “not known or used before.”).
39. See generally John Walker, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (R.C. Alston) (1791)
(emphasis added).
40. Patent Act of 1973, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109 (emphasis added).
41. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188,
2194 (2011) (“Although much in intellectual property law has changed in the 220 years since the first Patent Act, the basic idea that inventors have the right to patent their inventions has not.”).
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of courts, instituting the “novelty” requirement for patents, codifying the statutory
bars, and clarifying the law for cases of conflicting patents.42 However, this legislation had no effect on the language defining an inventor.43 The next laws regarding
patents were passed in 1839 and created a grace period of two years for publication
or use of the invention by the inventor before filing the application.44 However, this
was later shortened to a one-year grace period in 1939, which is what the grace
period still is today.45 The most recent patent law overhaul occurred in 1952, and
while it made many slight changes to the law, the two major changes made require
that an invention be nonobvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art and to
codify a definition and penalties for infringement.46 Thus, while Congress has
passed much legislation regarding patent law in the U.S. since the Patent Acts of
1790 and 1793, none of this legislation has changed the tenet that original inventors
have the exclusive right to patent their respective inventions.47
Additionally, judicial support for the definition of inventor as the first-toinvent can be found in the courts’ historical construction of the word.48 As early as
the beginning of the nineteenth century, courts held that the property right in an
invention vested in the inventor “from the moment of invention” and the process of
obtaining a patent “only perfected” that right.49 As a district court judge said in
1826, “[i]t is very true that ‘the right to a patent belongs to him who is the first inventor, even before the patent is granted.’ That is, none but the first inventor can
have a patent.”50 As these district court decisions show, the patent is simply a formal step one must make to publish their rights in their invention and subsequently
benefit from a right to exclude others from using the invention. Even the Supreme
Court adopted this view of patent law, that “the right is created by the invention,
and not by the patent.”51 This viewpoint of rights to an invention vesting in the first
inventor, and not the first filer, is a recurring theme throughout the Supreme
Court’s holdings.52 The Supreme Court recently affirmed this history of patents
42. A Brief History of the Patent Law of The United States, LADAS & PARRY LLP,
http://www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
43. Id.
44. Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353 (1839) (“An act in addition to An act to promote
the progress of the useful arts”).
45. Patent Act of 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212 (1939) (“An act to amend sections 4886,
4887, 4920, and 4929 of the Revised Statutes, (U.S.C., title 35, secs. 31, 32, 69, and 73)”).
46. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (“An act to revise and codify the laws relating to patents and the Patent Office, and to enact into law title 35 of the United States Code entitled Patents”).
47. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 131 S. Ct. at 2194–95.
48. See id. at 2190 (“Since 1790, the patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.” Id.).
49. Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813), aff’d, 13 U.S. 199 (1815).
50. Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1048 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826).
51. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 7 (1829) (emphasis in original).
52. See Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 319 (1833) (holding that “it clearly appears, that it was the
intention of the legislature, by a compliance with the requisites of the law, to vest the exclusive right in the
inventor only.”); Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 493 (1850) (“[T]he discoverer of a new and
useful improvement is vested by law with an inchoate right to its exclusive use, which he may perfect and
make absolute by proceeding in the manner which the law requires.”); Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S.
342, 346 (1890) (“[W]hatever invention [an inventor] may thus conceive and perfect is his individual property.”); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933) (noting that an inventor owns
“the result of an inventive act, the birth of an idea . . . the product of original thought . . .”).
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rights vesting to the first inventor in 2011 by acknowledging that their “precedents
confirm the general rule that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.”53
As over two centuries of court decisions and legislative language demonstrate, the Constitution defines an inventor as the first to discover rather than first to
file; and thus, the Constitution requires a first-to-invent rather than a first-to-file
system.54 In light of this consistent legislative language and court interpretations, it
is clear that the grant of exclusive rights is one given to the individual who is the
true and first inventor, and any first-to-file system flies in the face of what the Constitution mandates.55 Not only does this long history suggest a constitutional bar
against a first-to-file system, but “the lack of historical precedent for [Congress’s
action]” with respect to the reciprocal viewpoint is also arguably “the most telling
indication of the severe constitutional problem.” 56 Thus, legislative history and over
200 years of courts’ interpretation strongly suggests that the Constitution requires a
first-to-invent system rather than a first-to-file scheme.
III. THE AIA: FIRST-TO-INVENT VERSUS FIRST-TO-FILE
A. Pertinent Provisions Undergoing Change
In shifting from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system, the America Invents Act contradicts both the text and the historical understanding of the
Copyright and Patent Clause in the Constitution.
Adam Mossoff57
As previously discussed, the AIA is making sweeping changes to the current
American patent law system by switching from the long followed first-to-invent
system to the first-to-file system of awarding priority rights in patent applications.58
This change should harmonize the U.S. patent system with global patent systems. 59

53. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188,
2195 (2011).
54. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the
United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 8 (2004) (“Given that historically
the inventor has been viewed as first to create, then such tradition may suggest a constitutionally rooted
requirement that would preclude a first to file system and thus thwart harmonization . . . .”).
55. Michael A. Glenn & Peter J. Nagle, Article I and the First Inventor to File: Patent Reform
or Doublespeak?, 50 IDEA 441, 461–462. (2010) (“It is clear that the patent grant was never intended to be
a race to the U.S. patent office, a race in which the legions of fleet-footed lawyers in the pay of powerful
market forces are sure to win. The Article I grant is an individual right granted to the true and first inventor
and the Constitution does not support a tortured interpretation urged by proponents of a first inventor to file
system.”).
56. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F. 3d 667, 669 (2008) (Kavanaugh, J.
dissenting)).
57. Adam Mossoff, The First-to-File Provision in H.R. 1249 is Unconstitutional: A Textual and
Historical
Analysis,
LAW.ASU.EDU,
3
(2011)
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/Patent/MossoffHR1249Unconstitutional(2011).pdf.
58. See 157 CONG. REC. H4423 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Dana
Rohrabacher).
59. See id.

208

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 50

Prior to the passing of the AIA, the Patent Act explicitly awarded rights in an invention to the first inventor by stating:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or…
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g)(1) during the course of an interference conducted under section
135 or section 291, another inventor involved therein establishes, to the
extent permitted in section 104, that before such person's invention thereof
the invention was made by such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, or (2) before such person's invention thereof, the
invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention
under this subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective
dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to
practice, from a time prior to conception by the other. 60
Courts have consistently interpreted this language in the Patent Act to give
priority of invention “to the first party to [1] reduce an invention to practice unless
[2] the other party can show that it was the first to conceive of the invention and
that it exercised reasonable diligence in later reducing that invention to practice.”61
However, Section 3 of the AIA not only deletes Section 102(f) and (g) regarding
priority, but also changes the language of Section 102(a) of the Patent Act to award
the first filer by changing the language to the following:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication,
or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or
(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section
151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under
section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be,
names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing
date of the claimed invention.62
As the language of Section 3 of the AIA shows, all references to the invention
date in the Patent Act of 1952 have now been removed and effectively replaced
with a focus on the effective filing date.63 Thus, any patent application filed after
the effective date of March 16, 2013 is now given a priority date of its filing date,
60.
phasis added).
61.
62.
63.
49–50 (2012).

35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (f), (g) (2012) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 102 (West 2013)) (emCooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 2, §3, at 285–86 (emphasis added).
Daniel J. Sherwinter & Patrick M. Boucher, The America Invents Act, 41 COLO. LAW. 47,
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and priority between conflicting applications is now determined by the filing date
rather than the invention date.64 However, before this occurs, the AIA must first
pass the test presented by pending cases that challenge the constitutionality of the
first-to-file scheme and examine the various legal and policy driven arguments on
both sides of the divide.65
B. Challenges to America Invents Act
1. Policy Driven Arguments
The main reason, purpose, and motivation the proponents of the AIA have for
passing the legislation “is to harmonize our law, American patent law, with Europe.”66 The reason international harmonization in patent law is so attractive is to
“simplify and expedite an inventor’s ability to obtain worldwide patent protection”
and strengthen that protection.67 Additionally, this harmonization will allegedly
reduce costs of applying for, defending, and enforcing patents internationally, and
will simplify the patent rules.68 However, opponents of the AIA view this “harmonization” as another word for “succumbing to peer pressure” and wonder why, if
American law has always been stronger in this area, we must harmonize or weaken
our patent system.69 Indeed, the argument that this harmonization will weaken our
patent system finds strength in the statement made by the European Union in 2011
regarding how it is facing an “innovation emergency” in science and industry and is
still trailing far behind the U.S.70 While there is no doubt that this international
harmonization “will be more beneficial to large, multinational corporations,” it
does not necessarily follow that this harmonization will be better for the American
innovation and patent industry.71
Another frequently used argument in favor of passing the AIA and a first-tofile system is to simplify the complex system in place for interference proceedings.72 An interference proceeding, under the former system, is where the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences determines questions of priority for conflicting
patent applications and subsequently issues a patent to the applicant who is adjudged the prior inventor. 73 As Congressman Smith, one of the co-sponsors of the
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 8:12–cv–1589–T–
23MAP, 2013 WL 3155280 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013).
66. 157 Cong. Rec. H4423 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Dana Rohrabacher).
67. Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to the
United States’ First-to-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 687, 692 (1993).
68. Id. at 693.
69. Gary M. Lauder, Patently Absurd or: How to Go From the World’s Best Patent System to
Worst-Than-Most
in
a
Single
Step,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
7,
2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-lauder/patently-absurd-or-how-to_b_832703.html [hereinafter Patently Absurd]; 157 CONG. REC. H4423 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Dana Rohrabacher).
70. Raf Casert, EU Warns It Lags Behind in Global Innovation Race, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb 1,
2011, http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2014097347_apeueuinnovation.html.
71. Brad Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the United
States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent Reward System Really Beneficial to Patent Quality and Administrative Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 757, 765 (2006).
72. See 157 Cong. Rec. H4421 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2012) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §135(a) (West 2013)).
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Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, put it: “the current system lulls inventors into a
false sense of security based on the belief that they can readily and easily rely on
being the first-to-invent,” but these inventors forget “they must comply with the
complex legal procedures…” to win an interference proceeding. 74 Congressman
Smith argues that the former patent system’s costly and complex process truly hurts
small inventors because they commonly lose their patent rights in these expensive
battles over ownership.75 In support of these claims, he stated that “[i]n the last 7
years…only one independent inventor out of 3 million patent applications has
proved an earlier date of invention over the inventor who filed first.” 76
While this may be true, comparing the amount of number of successful interference contests with the number of patents issued does not accurately depict the
small inventor’s chances of winning an interference. When considering just interference contests, research shows that roughly 40% of these small parties did in fact
beat the larger parties.77 Indeed, this research suggests that small entities neither
gain nor lose on average from using the interference system.78 Thus, while parties
may not often challenge priority, actual litigation statistics show that when priority
is challenged, the smaller inventor does not have a disadvantage in the priority proceedings.79
Proponents of the bill also claim that first-to-file will “simplify the patent application system and provide increased certainty to businesses that they can commercialize a patent that has been granted.”80 This certainty is accomplished because
once a patent is issued, the inventor no longer has to worry about priority and can
simply rely on the first filing date and move forward, which will allegedly help
“raise capital, grow businesses, and create jobs.”81 While this may be true, there is
too large an emphasis placed on this argument. Though this argument trumpets
saving “significant time and money” on these disputes, it fails to account for the

74. 157 CONG. REC. H4421 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Mark T. Banner & John J. McDonnell, First-to-file, Mandatory Reexamination, and
Mandatory “Exceptional Circumstance”: Ideas for Better? Or Worse?, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 595, 602 (1987) (“Thus, considering all of the statistics concerning Board decisions as a whole,
priority was awarded to the junior party, in whole or in part, in 42.7 percent of the cases.”); Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299,
1309 (2003).
78. See Banner & McDonnell, supra note 77, at 602; Lemley & Chien, supra note 77, at 1309.
79. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to
Small
Entities,
84
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
425,
430
(2002).
TABLE 6. Small Entities Advantaged and Disadvantaged by the First-to-Invent System FY 1983-2000
Small Entities
Advantaged
Disadvantaged

80.
81.

Independent Inventors

98

115

Small Businesses

83

75

Nonprofit Institutions

22

11

Total

203

201

157 CONG. REC. S1089-01 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (Statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
Id.
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reality that “the percentage of patent applications that involve a priority dispute is
quite small.”82 Thus, because there are such a small amount of priority disputes, the
amount of time and money spent on them cannot be that significant; yet the value
of having priority disputes can be invaluable for parties who can show priority.
Although there are only a small number of priority disputes, it is unreasonable to do
away with priority disputes just for the sake of clarity. That would be along the
same lines of an argument that, because there are only a small number of infringement cases, they are unimportant as well. 83 Therefore, although patent priority suits
may be costly, the small amount of them does not make that argument as significant as AIA proponents would like to think it is. The loss in having the option to
litigate patent priority suits would in fact be a bigger loss than any loss seen in
money and time spent on these proceedings because the option of having priority
disputes available is more important in “determining who gets a patent.”84
On the other side of the argument regarding the passing of the AIA is the interesting notion that giving the first filer priority may create patent applications that
are incomplete or poorly drafted in order to be the first filer. The importance of this
argument stems from the idea that an efficient patent system depends on the
amount and quality of its patents. 85 Under the first-to-file system, the number of
applications and speed in which these applications are filed will increase substantially while the quality of these patents will decrease.86 For example, the Japanese
first-to-file patent system has over five times as many applications filed annually
than does the U.S. system.87 While other factors could explain this difference in
number of applications, the first-to-file standard is certainly a significant factor.
The large number of applications filed in Japan and the corresponding decline in
patent application quality demonstrate what could be in store for America under a
first-to-file system.88 Subsequently, practicing lawyers “fear that this decline in
quality will have a detrimental effect on future scientific development.” 89
Perhaps the strongest argument against the first-to-file provision of the AIA is
the negative effects of the “race to the office” on small inventors and businesses.
As small businesses stated in a letter to the Legal Advisor of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO):
82. Lemley & Chien, supra note 77, at 1331.
83. Lemley & Chien, supra note 77, at 1331. Indeed, “[t]he data suggests that interferences are
litigated to judgment in about the same percentage of applications as infringement suits are litigated to
judgment once a patent issues.” Id. at 1308. Thus, “[o]ne cannot say that the small number of priority disputes does not matter anymore than one would argue that litigated cases of infringement do not matter to
the patent system.” Id. at 1331; see also Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2001).
84. Lemley & Chien, supra note 77, at 1331.
85. Charles R.B. Macedo, Note, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 543, 573–74 (1988) (“The efficiency of
any system depends upon the quantity and quality of the applications filed.”).
86. Id. at 573 (“Under a first-to-file system, it would become even more important for an inventor to establish a priority date by quickly filing an application. Thus, practitioners predict that the number of
applications filed at [the] Patent Office would increase in quantity and decrease in quality under a first-tofile system.”).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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By repealing the invention date as the priority date, compared to prior art,
the AIA will dramatically increase the pressure on small businesses to establish filing date priority and require them to file more frequently and at
every stage of development without the opportunity to perfect their inventions. The costs of these filings . . . and the considerable amount of time
involved with more frequent invention reviews, preparation and related filings will be felt most strongly by the small business community. Large,
multinational corporations have the resources to file more applications
quicker and earlier in the development process and will have a disproportionate advantage over their independent and smaller counterparts. The
implementation of this rule will deliver a critical blow to small-business
patentees and place them at a significant disadvantage in the patenting
process.90
This argument, while certainly worth mentioning and briefly describing here,
will be addressed in full detail later in this article. 91
In conclusion, the policy arguments in favor of switching to a first-to-file system seem to favor one group of people: large corporations. Indeed, large international corporations benefit from harmonizing the U.S. patent system with the global
patent systems and removing interference provisions to award patent rights to the
company that can most quickly file patents. However, not only will the race to the
patent office likely reduce the quality of patents awarded, but it will also significantly disfavor small businesses as will be discussed.92 Finally, the strongest argument against the passing of the America Invents Act is the constitutionality of having a first-to-file system.93
2. Constitutionality Arguments
The Patents and Copyrights clause located in Article 1, section 8 of the United States Constitution is “both a grant of power and a limitation.”94 However, Congress may not “overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose,” and it cannot enlarge the monopoly “without regard to innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby.”95 However, the AIA seeks to overreach
those restraints by ignoring the fact that “inventor means first inventor in the Constitution.”96 As recent as 2011, none other than the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, John Roberts, stated that “[s]ince 1790, the patent law has
operated on the premise that rights in an invention belong to the inventor,” and that
“[a]lthough much in intellectual property law has changed in the 220 years since
the first Patent Act, the basic idea that inventors have the right to patent their inven-

90. McCracken, supra note 13, at 3 (“The National Small Business Association (NSBA) is the
nation’s older nonpartisan small business advocacy organization, with more than 65,000 small business
member in virtually every industry across the country.”).
91. See infra Part IV.
92. See infra Part IV.
93. See supra Part I.A–B; infra Part III.B.2.
94. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
95. Id. at 5–6.
96. 157 CONG. REC. H4422 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner).
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tions has not.”97 The AIA implements language98 inconsistent with both the long
history of awarding rights to the first and only inventor 99 and the idea that the rights
protected by our patent system are pre-existing rights.
Proponents of the America Invents Act argue that the first-to-file provision is
constitutional because an applicant still must be a “bona fide inventor to qualify”
for patent rights.100 Suggesting that by requiring that an applicant be a bona fide
inventor, the AIA establishes a “first-inventor-to-file” standard and will not simply
allow an applicant to steal an invention.101 These proponents argue that the firstinventor-to-file system fits within the constitution’s meaning because it requires
any subsequent inventor “to have come up with the idea independently and separately.”102
However, not only is the first-inventor-to-file justification inconsistent with
over 200 years of law, 103 but it also flies in the face of the actual text of the Patents
Clause. The Patents Clause expressly states that it promotes the progress of science
and useful arts by “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”104 This language of “securing” inventors rights to their respective “discoveries” suggests that the right is a
pre-existing right that a patent ensures, and not a right that is granted by the patent.
In 1972, Joseph Barnes explained in one of the earliest treatises on patents how preexisting rights exist under the language of securing:
[A] system for securing property in the products of genius is a mutual contract between the inventor and the public, in which the inventor agrees, on
proviso that the public will secure to him his property in, and the exclusive
use of his discovery for a limited time, he will, at the expiration of such
time, cede his right in the same to the public . . . .105
Additional support for this strict textualist view of the Patent Clause comes
from the fact that the drafters of the Constitution were former British subjects. 106
Under the English Crown in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the courts
made a practice of granting monopolies to “court favorites in goods or businesses
which had long before been enjoyed by the public.” 107 Looking at the drafters of
97. Bd. Of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188,
2192–94 (2011) (emphasis added).
98. See supra Part III.A.
99. See supra Part II.B.
100. 157 CONG. REC. H4422 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte).
101. Id.
102. Id. at H4423.
103. See supra Part II.B.
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
105. Jonathan S. Massey, Why First To File Is Unconstitutional, in WHY H.R. 1249 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
1,
available
at
http://docs.piausa.org/112th-Congress%20(20112012)/Why%20H.R.%201249%20is%20Unconstitutional.pdf (emphasis omitted) (last visited Nov. 25,
2013). Interestingly, Jonathan Massey is the attorney for the recently dismissed case challenging the constitutionality of the AIA in Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 8:12–cv–1589–T–
23MAP, 2013 WL 3155280 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013).
106. Adam J. Sedia, Storming the Last Bastion: The Patent Reform Act of 2007 and Its Assault on
the Superior First-to-Invent Rule, 18 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 79, 118 (2007).
107. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
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the Constitution and their desire to end monopoly granting in established products,
it is clear that they chose the language “securing” to show that the rights do in fact
vest upon the inventing, and not the granting, of the patent as the AIA implements.108 Thus, when viewing the text of the Patent Clause and its drafters’ historical background, it is clear that the strict textualist approach of those who “view the
first-to-file system as unconstitutional appear to have the better argument.” 109
In contrast, proponents of the first-to-file system also look to judicial precedent to argue that U.S. courts have long recognized that a second inventor may be
awarded a patent under certain circumstances.110 The first Supreme Court case to
award patent rights to a second inventor was Gayler v. Wilder in 1850.111 There, the
Court gave the patent rights to the second inventor because the first inventor had
not made his idea public.112 The Court held that “by knowledge and use the legislature meant knowledge and use existing in a manner accessible to the public.” 113 The
Court reasoned that although an inventor may not be “strictly speaking the first and
original inventor,” the legislature meant to secure rights for inventors who made
“knowledge and use exist[] in a manner accessible to the public.”114 There is a line
of case law following this reasoning since the Gayler v. Wilder decision.115 However, these cases are all decided under the same exception, or justification, to award
patent rights to the second inventor.116 These cases, the only cases that award patent
rights to the second inventor, all allow the second inventor to have priority because
“the inventor who designedly, and with the view of applying it indefinitely and
exclusively for his own profit, withholds his invention from the public, comes not
within the policy or objects of the Constitution or acts of Congress.” 117 Except for
these cases, which reinforce the Patent Act’s primary policy of public disclosure,
the second inventor never gets priority over the first inventor. Thus, any attempt to
glean support from this line of cases is without merit as the AIA simply gives the
first filer priority regardless of whether the first party was in fact suppressing or
concealing his invention or actively trying to reduce it to practice.
However, those in favor of the first-inventor-to-file system do make some
very compelling policy arguments that are compatible with Congress’ constitutional limitations. They argue that the patent policy in the Constitution is to in fact

108. Edward C. Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the United States Came to Have a
“First-to-Invent” Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 286 (noting that “the first patent bill propos[ing] a
specific mechanism for determining the ‘first and true’ inventor . . . may have come about because the
English practice in determining priority of invention was unclear and in any case deemed unsatisfactory.”).
109. Sedia, supra note 106, at 118.
110. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 24, Madstad
Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, No. 8:12-cv-01589-SDM-MAP, 2012 WL 4050858
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court, and other courts, have long concluded that a person who
is second to invent still qualifies as an inventor and may, under certain circumstances, be entitled to a patent.”).
111. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477 (1850).
112. Id. at 477.
113. Id. at 497.
114. Id.
115. See Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co. v. Beat ‘Em All Barbed-Wire Co., 143 U.S. 275 (1892);
Kendall v. Windsor, 62 U.S. 322 (1858).
116. See Washburn, 143 U.S. 275; Kendall, 62 U.S. 322.
117. Kendall, 62 U.S. at 328.
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promote the science by bringing new ideas into the public domain. 118 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has said that, according to the Constitution, the reason for securing
these limited exclusive rights, or the “the reward,” is to gain the “advantage[] derived by the public” by getting access to new forms of important knowledge. 119
These rewards in exclusive rights are simply given to the owner as “a secondary
consideration,” and were considered by our founders to be a necessary embarrassment.120 By having the progress of science as the main purpose of the Patents
Clause, it seems that the first-to-file standard does a better job of accomplishing
this purpose, as it compels disclosure to the public as fast as possible to gain priority rights.
Nonetheless, this argument fails to address the consequences of encouraging
speed. While giving priority to the first inventor does encourage faster disclosure to
the public, this also encourages poor quality in patent applications. 121 These potentially sloppy disclosures, made in haste to gain priority, will likely result in rejected
applications with insufficient claims.122 In light of these insufficient claims, inventors will make patentable improvements to the claims. However, these improvements will likely be unprofitable because they will be easily discoverable through
now obvious research.123 Conversely, the first-to-file system encourages more care
because inventors know that they need only show progress to reduce the invention
to practice and that careful drafting of applications will reduce the chances of the
claims being found invalid during the prosecution process and any potential litigation.124 Therefore, the argument that a first-to-file system would be better for the
policy of compelling public disclosure is misplaced, as it will in fact diminish the
quality of and bog down our patent system.
While there are many arguments in favor of the current first-to-invent system,
one compelling argument may cause courts to uphold the constitutionality of the
AIA. Generally, the Supreme Court provides Congress a very wide birth when legislating under the Patents and Copyrights Clause of the Constitution.125 In Golan v.
Holder, the Court upheld the constitutionality of provisions in the Uruguay Round
Amendments Act of 1994, which granted U.S. copyrights to foreign works formerly unprotected in the U.S.126 The Court reasoned that “[g]iven the authority we hold
Congress has, we will not second-guess the political choice Congress made between leaving the public domain untouched and embracing Berne unstintingly.”127
Another example in the realm of copyright law comes from Eldred v. Ashcroft,
where the Court held that extending copyright protection to the life of the author
118. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“[T]he ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through
disclosure.”).
119. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832).
120. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
121. Sedia, supra note 106, at 119–20.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 875 (2012).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 887.
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plus seventy years did not violate the constitutional requirement that copyrights
may only endure for limited times.128 Again, the Court reasoned that the legislative
authority conferred on Congress by the Copyright Clause requires the Court to “defer substantially to Congress.”129
This substantial deference given to Congress by the Supreme Court has also
been seen in many patent law cases.130 In the landmark patent law case of Graham
v. John Deere Co., the Court held that “[w]ithin the limits of the constitutional
grant, the Congress may . . . implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.” 131 This
power also extends to “set[ting] out conditions and tests for patentability.”132 Indeed, this deference to Congress with respect to the Patents Clause was established
as far back as 1843 in McClurg v. Kingsland, where the Court noted “the powers of
Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and . . . there are no restraints on its exercise . . . .”133 Thus, it seems that
the Supreme Court will likely have a strong inclination to not interfere with Congress’ choice to pass the AIA.
However, the fact remains that the text, the policy arguments, and 220 years
of law suggest that first-to-file should not be upheld as constitutional.134 After all,
judicial “deference in matters of policy cannot, however, become abdication in
matters of law.”135 Indeed, this seemingly obvious unconstitutional provision of the
AIA might rise to the level warned about in Marbury v. Madison: “The powers of
the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken,
or forgotten, the constitution is written.” 136 The first-to-file standard does seem to
forget the language of the Patents Clause, and it is not only within the courts discretion to strike down unconstitutional provisions, but in fact “there can be no question that it is the responsibility of this Court to enforce the limits on federal power
by striking down acts of Congress that transgress those limits.” 137 While most people agree that something needs to be done about the problems inherent in our patent
system, the AIA is not the correct means to go about solving the problems, as it
would in fact make a larger problem. Fixing these small problems may substantiate
the famous quote that “[m]ost problems begin as solutions.”138 If litigation challenging the first-to-file provision of the AIA reaches the Supreme Court, they will
have to decide the question: Is the AIA constitutional, or did Congress jump onto
the wrong solution because the problems with the current patent system were very
relevant?
128. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 769 (2002).
129. Id. at 189; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should
be granted to authors . . . in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product.”).
130. See Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1031–32 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
131. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
132. Id
133. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843).
134. Sedia, supra note 106, at 118.
135. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579–80 (2012).
136. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
137. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579–80 (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175–76) (emphasis
added).
138. Lauder, Patently Absurd, supra note 69, at 1.
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IV. HARMFUL EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESSES
A. Small Businesses and Innovation
From the mom-and-pop storefront shops that anchor Main Street to the
high-tech startups that keep America on the cutting edge, small businesses
are the backbone of our economy and the cornerstones of our Nation’s
promise.
President Barack Obama139
There is no doubt that “[s]mall businesses are the backbone of the U.S. economy, and the primary source of jobs for Americans.” 140 Indeed, as congressional
opponents of the AIA brought to light, the facts about small businesses in the 2007
fiscal year are as follows: they represent 99.7% of all employer firms; employ just
over half of all private sector employees; generated 64% of new net jobs over the
past fifteen years; create more than half of the nonfarm private gross domestic
product; hire 40% of high-tech workers; make up 97.3% of all identified exporters;
and produced 30.2% of the known export value.141
The effects of small business are also felt strongly in the patent industry as,
according to a recent study performed by the Small Business Association, “small
innovative firms obtained patents at a rate of 26.5 per hundred employees” from
2002–06 and large innovative firms obtained patents at a rate of 1.7 per hundred
employees.142 On average, “small innovative firms patent at a rate [sixteen] times
higher than large innovative firms from a patents-per-employee perspective.”143
Moreover, even in the smaller companies this is more prevalent, as “companies
with fewer than 25 employees will have a higher patent-to-employee ratio on average than firms with 50 employees, which will in turn have a higher patent-toemployee ratio than firms with 100 employees, and so on.” 144 Thus, small businesses outperform larger businesses in patent issuance.
Additionally, these patents issued to small firms are more technologically important than those issued to large corporations. Small firms are twice as likely to

139. Karen Mills, Support Your Local Businesses on “Small Business Saturday,” THE WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 23, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/11/23/support-yourlocal-businesses-small-business-saturday.
140. Small Business, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/small-business (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
141. 157 CONG. REC. H4427 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (unenacted). “The U.S. Department of
Commerce defines small businesses as businesses which employ less than 500 employees.” See also id.
142. Anthony Breitzman & Patrick Thomas, Analysis of Small Business Innovation in Green
Technologies, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY 11 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs389tot.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Anthony Breitzman & Diana Hicks, An Analysis of Small Business Patents by Industry and
Firm Size, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY iii (Nov. 2008), available at
http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/rs335tot.pdf.
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produce a patent that will be among the 1% most cited patents.145 Thus, in addition
to producing more patents per employee, the patents issued are more technologically important.
Small businesses are also the primary stimulus of new job growth, as their innovation tends to be in “high tech, high growth industries, such as biotechnology,
pharmaceuticals, information technology, and semiconductors.” 146 While large
businesses do, of course, innovate, they are more likely to create incremental advances in an industry to existing products, whereas the innovation from small firms
is more likely to be a revolutionary advance. 147 This puts valuable technology in the
hands of the small companies, resulting in many large companies either buying
these small companies or licensing innovations from them. 148 This results in small
firms being the “principal driver of new job growth,”149 as well as generating the
“overwhelming majority of new high-paying American jobs.”150
This dominance in patent efficiency per employee, technologically important
patents, and technologically revolutionizing advances that small businesses have
compared to large corporations is important because patent rights are “vital to promoting innovation and creativity,” which are “essential element[s] of our freeenterprise, market-based system.”151 This promotion of innovation, in turn, is “a
primary driver of U.S. economic growth and national competitiveness.” 152 Thus,
small entities’ excellence in the patent industry, as well as their ability to spur innovation at a greater level than large corporations, has helped make the “innovation
economy of the United States . . . the envy of the world.”153
B. America Versus the Rest of the World
The U.S. has the most innovative economy in the world…
Gary Lauder154
It is clear that the “innovation economy of the United States is the envy of the
world,” as “[o]ur venture capital industry accounts for more than 85% of the
world’s venture capital.”155 Indeed, opposed to economies such as Europe’s, that
145. CHI Research, Inc., Small Serial Innovators: The Small Firm Contribution To Technical
Change, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY 3 (Feb. 27, 2003), available at
http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/rs225tot.pdf.
146. Breitzman & Hicks, supra note 144, at i.
147. John Neis, Post-Grant Review—Our Next Nightmare? VC Perspective, 2 MED.
INNOVATIONS
&
BUS.
43,
45
(2010),
available
at
http://www.ipadvocate.org/mibj/pdfs/Neis_PGR%20VC.pdf.
148. Gary Lauder, Venture Capital – The Buck Stops Where?, 2 MED. INNOVATIONS & BUS. 14,
19 (2010), available at http://www.ipadvocate.org/mibj/pdfs/Lauder_Buck%20Stops.pdf [hereinafter
Venture Capital].
149. Neis, supra note 147.
150. Lauder, Venture Capital, supra note 148.
151. ECON. AND STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS, at v (Mar. 2012) available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf.
152. Id.
153. Neis, supra note 147, at 43.
154. Lauder, Venture Capital, supra note 148.
155. Neis, supra note 147, at 43.
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“suffer[] from extraordinary corporate rigidity,” the U.S. economy allows start-ups
to break into the corporate scene.156 In contrast, Europe’s economy stifles innovation, which is “why Europe has failed to produce a Bill Gates.” 157 In the second
half of the twentieth century, Europe produced only twelve Fortune 500 Companies
while the U.S. produced fifty-one, and other emerging countries produced fortysix.158 Young companies in the U.S. simply have an easier time emerging than
similar companies in Europe.159 Moreover, while many companies are created in
European countries, the U.S. economy allows start-up companies to grow much
faster than their European counterparts. 160 The U.S. patent system is one of these
enabling factors.161
C. How First-to-File Will Hurt Small Entities
We believe that much of the legislation is a disincentive to inventiveness,
and stifles new businesses and job growth by threatening the financial rewards available to innovators in [the] U.S. industry.
John Meredith & Keith Grzelak162
One of the main policy questions regarding switching from first-to-file to
first-to-invent is that patent priority will become a “race” to the patent office to file
a patent application, which will favor large corporations over small companies and
individual inventors.163 The basic idea is that the large corporations, which have
more resources, such as more lawyers and money, will be able to get through the
patent prosecution process faster than their smaller competitors, who have fewer
156. Thomas Philippon & Nicholas Véron, Financing Europe’s Fast Movers, BRUEGEL 2 (Jan.
2008)
http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/55539994?access_key=key-17bapnbussvx38t1hhd1&allow
_share=true&view_mode=scroll (quoting Leslie Crawford, Rebel Seeks Innovators to Shake Up Europe,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/people/knicolaidis/clippings.pdf).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id. Graph from Philippon & Véron, supra note 156, at 3.

161. Lauder, Patently Absurd, supra note 69, at 2 (“The existing US patent system is one of the
enablers of newer companies to establish themselves.”).
162. Letter from John Meredith, President, IEEE-USA & Keith Grzelak, Intellectual Prop. Policy
Comm. Chairman, IEEE-USA, to Senator Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader (Aug. 27, 2007), available
at http://www.patenthawk.com/blog_docs/070827_IEEE-USA_Patent%20Reform-Senate.pdf.
163. Donald S. Chisum, The Harmonization of International Patent Law, 26 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 437, 447 (1993).
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resources, and win the race to the patent office to gain patent priority. 164 There are
several ways large corporations will have a distinct advantage over small companies.
The cost of filing patent applications is less of a concern for large corporations, as resources are less of a factor compared to small start-ups.165 Studies show
that relatively smaller firms tend to report a significantly higher sensitivity to the
costs of filing and enforcing patents, whereas the difficulties and costs of acquiring
and enforcing patents is not salient for larger firms.166 Small companies must raise
capital by presenting to investors or by slowing their design for a patent to put
company money towards their patent prosecution. During this time, large companies are able to file an application much faster, regardless of who invented first, and
gain priority.167
Additionally, larger corporations have an advantage over small companies
because they have more patent attorneys or agents as well as routinized patent procedures put in place for faster patent application. 168 This corporate advantage will
put “undue pressure on patent attorneys and agents to provide unreasonably fast
service to their [small] clients” which will lead to “poor quality disclosures. . . [on
smaller entities’] patent applications.”169
These company capital and legal resource factors raise serious questions
about the first-to-file system and its likely effect on small entities. While these
questions and concerns are merely conjectural at the moment, many answers can be
found in looking to other similar transitions taken by other countries.
D. Caution from Canada
In short, we find with some confidence that a shift to first-to-file from firstto-invent results in a reduction of patenting by individual inventors relative to firms.
David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner170
Though the U.S. cannot yet see the effects the AIA will have on small businesses and inventors, a recent shift did occur in a highly-developed country comparable to the U.S.171 In 1989, Canada changed their patent system from a first-toinvent system to a first-to-file system.172 This switch serves as a great comparative
tool to predict the effects the AIA will have on the U.S., as Canada has a very simi164. David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents Act
and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 520 (2013).
165. Id. at 528 n.62. (“The most recent statistics available from the American Intellectual Property Law Association suggests that on average filing a patent application of low complexity costs about
$7[,]000, and that filing a patent of relative complexity costs between $9[,]000 and $12,000.”).
166. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of
the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1310 (2009).
167. Lauder, Patently Absurd, supra note 69, at 10.
168. Abrams & Wagner, supra note 164, at 528–29.
169. Chisum, supra note 163, at 447–48.
170. Abrams & Wagner, supra note 164, at 559; see also id. at 521 (“We find that the Canadian
change to FTF generally harmed individual inventors.”).
171. Id. at 521.
172. Id.
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lar patent system to that of the U.S., similar economic features, close geographic
proximity, and shares a similar, integrated economy with the U.S.173 These similarities make a comparison between Canada’s switch to first-to-file and the U.S.’s
switch both possible and helpful in determining how the switch will affect small
companies in the U.S.
Several studies have been performed, giving much needed empirical evidence
on how the switch from first-to-file and first-to-invent influences the level and distribution of incentive activity. 174 Using information made available from the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO)175 as the output and R&D spending as the
input, these studies measured “inventive activity carried out by Canadians before
and after the enactment” of the first-to-file system.176 Acknowledging that other
factors besides the change of law can affect the results of the study and measuring
innovativeness, the studies isolated possible confounding effects by focusing their
analysis on inventive activity between certain dates 177 or with techniques that control for these unwanted effects.178 After performing an empirical analysis on the
data collected, the studies analyzed their results and came back with many conclusions and observations,179 of which this report is concerned about the individual
inventors versus large corporations patenting behavior.
To test the idea of whether a shift in patent policy will hurt small entities, the
studies examined the representation of individual inventors in the U.S. and Canada.180 The data in Canada shows a “sharp decline in the fraction of individual inventors, from 10.7% prior to the end of 1989 to 7.8% afterward.”181 In the U.S. “the
proportion of individual inventors dropped slightly, from 17.4% to 16.5%.”182 Both
of these trends show that the fraction of individual inventors following the Canadian law change experienced a decline. Indeed, not only did Canadian small businesses witness a substantial decline in patenting in the U.S., but large corporations
continued to experience substantial growth, making small inventors “lose ground”
to them.183 The conclusions from studies have been consistent in their findings:
173. Id. at 531.
174. Shih-tse Lo & Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Does it Matter Who Has the Right to Patent: First-toinvent or First-to-file? Lessons From Canada, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 2 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14926.pdf?new_window=1.
175. See generally IP Data Products: Patents, CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE,
http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr02466.html (last visited Nov. 25,
2013).
176. Lo & Sutthiphisal, supra note 174, at 5.
177. Id. at 11 (“[To] assess the impact of the Reforms on Canadian inventors while isolating possible confounding effects caused by shifts in U.S. patent policy and international treaties, our analysis focuses on inventive activity during 1983 and 1994.”).
178. Abrams & Wagner, supra note 164, at 532 (“The research design we employ is a modern
econometric technique known as difference-in-difference analysis, which is used to control for effects other
than the priority rule change. By comparing the observed differences in individual patenting behavior in
Canada across the 1989 change in law to the differences in individual patenting behavior in the United
States during the same time period, we can isolate the effect of the law change on individual patenting
behavior in Canada.” (emphasis added)).
179. Id. at 536.
180. Id. at 546.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Lo & Sutthiphisal, supra note 174, at 27.
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The divergence between small entities and large corporations in patenting
after the Reforms supports the idea that a switch to a first-to-file system
will result in relatively less inventive activity being carried out by independent inventors as well as small businesses, and more being channeled
through large corporations instead.184
Additionally, not only did the switch have a negative impact on independent
inventors and small firms, but “Canada’s adoption of a first-to-file system had virtually no positive effect on its overall inventive activity.”185 Indeed, another result
from the switch to first-to-file was that “[p]atents made by American inventors
were, on average, of a higher value than those made by Canadians...”186
Thus, Canada has shown the U.S. that the switch to first-to-file, while having
many positive results, such as international harmonization and streamlining of patent priority, does come at a cost. This cost may not seem significant as the number
of overall patent applications did not decrease, but small inventors have played an
important role in the U.S. since its independence. Examples such as Thomas Edison, Bill Gates, Yahoo!, and Google, Inc. illustrate that point. 187 The patent switch
might not hurt overall patent application numbers, but it will significantly affect the
people who have kept us at the forefront of the world’s technological advances.
E. Lobbying the America Invents Act
First inventors have the exclusive constitutional right to their inventions.
This right extends to every citizen, not just those with deep pockets and
large legal teams. A politicized patent system will further entrench those
very powerful interests with deep pockets and lots of lobbying offices…
Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur188
When looking to see who will benefit from a controversial bill, determining
who the main lobbyists for the passing of the bill is often the best way to determine
who the bill may benefit and who the bill may harm. In November of 2011, First
Street Research Group, an association that “reviews, investigates and analyzes the
data in First Street [and the lobbying industry] to publish exclusive reports [and
analysis] on the people and organizations influencing policy in Washington,
DC.,”189 published a report on the lobbying of the America Invents Act 190 Lobbying
184. Id. at 27.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 21.
187. Id. at 29.
188. 157 CONG. REC. H4421 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Kaptur) (Marcy Kaptur
is the U.S. Representative for Ohio’s 9th Congressional District and is a member of the Democratic Party).
189. FIRST
STREET:
WHERE
PEOPLE
AND
POLICY
INTERSECT,
About,
http://www.firststreet.cqpress.com/content/about.aspx (last visited Nov. 25, 2013); see Zachary Sniderman,
Lobbyists and Politicians Beware: First Street Reveals Your Hidden Connections, MASHABLE (Nov. 18,
2011), http://mashable.com/2011/11/18/first-street-politics-platform/. This gives readers a better of idea of
where the facts and reports come from out of First Street: “First Street is based on decades of information
pulled from congressional staff directories and self-reporting forms. CQ Press, a political publishing house,
created First Street to turn that overwhelming amount of data into a searchable database on where people
worked, who they worked for, and where their allegiances may lie. The database currently contains more
than 660,000 lobbying forms, 240,000 congressional and federal staffers, 32,898 clients of registered lobbying organizations and 20,000 congressional and federal organizations. In total, First Street says it covers
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for the AIA in the House of Representatives involved 318 organizations and over
1,000 lobbyists who combined to spend an amount of over $400 million in efforts
to gain Congressional support.191 Lobbying in the Senate was similar with 289 organizations spending over $390 million in 2011 for their lobbying activity and over
1,000 lobbyists, including former members of Congress and other federal government workers.192 While many of the organizations involved in the lobbying are to
be expected, considering the clear large corporation benefits the AIA gives, there
will be some unexpected parties involved in the lobbying.
The organizations are ranked by the top five in quarterly spending in the following three areas: (a) the bill by amount spent lobbying, (b) the bill by number of
lobbyists hired, and (c) the USPTO by amount spent lobbying.193 The top five organizations that lobbied the bill by amount spent are as follows: (1) Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S.A. at $10,010,000; (2) National Association of Realtors at
$7,120,000; (3) AT&T Services, Inc. and its affiliates at $6,840,000; (4) General
Electric Company and its subsidiaries at $6,770,000; and (5) Comcast Corporation
at $5,820,000.194 The top organizations who lobbied using the highest number of
lobbyists are as follows: (1) Independent Community Bankers of America with
eighteen lobbyists spending $1,585,000; (2) Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association with sixteen lobbyists spending $1,370,000; (3) AT&T Services,
Inc. and its affiliates with fifteen lobbyists spending $6,840,000; (4) Yahoo! Inc.
with fifteen lobbyists spending $60,000; (5) Hewlett-Packard Company with fifteen
lobbyists spending $60,000; and (6) Research in Motion with fifteen lobbyists
spending $50,000.195 Finally, the top five organizations that lobbied the USPTO by
amount spent are as follows: (1) Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. at
$10,890,000; (2) General Electric Company and its subsidiaries at $8,590,000; (3)
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America at $4,690,000; (4) Pfizer,
Inc. at $3,790,000; and (5) National Association of Broadcasters at $3,240,000. 196
Other members of the coalition for the patent reform, are companies such as BP,
Caterpillar, Dow Chemical Company, DuPont, Motorola, and Texas Instruments. 197
more than 2 million connections.” Id.; see also First Street Research Group Report Reveals Lobbying Connections of GOP Candidates, BUSINESS WIRE, (March 19, 2012, 7:00 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120319005147/en/Street-Research-Group-Report-RevealsLobbying-Connections.
190. CQPRESS, FIRST STREET REPORT: LOBBYING THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT 1 (2011), available at http://www.firststreetresearch.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/first-street-report-lobbying-the-americainvents-act.pdf.
191. Id. at 2.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 4–6, 11 (This sets out values according to 2011 quarterly reports).
194. Id. at 4. While it may seem strange to see the National Association of Realtors as one of the
top spenders for lobbying the AIA, there is, of course, a reason for this. Realtors encounter the patent system mostly as a defendant to patent infringement lawsuits, and the AIA will put in place mechanisms to
reduce the costs and number of suits filed as well as making it less expensive to defend patent infringement
suits. See Robert Freedman, Obama Signs Patent Law: Help to Real Estate?, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS
(Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.speakingofrealestate.blogs.realtor.org/2011/09/16/obama-signs-patent-lawhelp-to-real-estate/.
195. CQPRESS, supra note 190, at 5–6.
196. Id. at 11.
197. Id. at 12.

224

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 50

While this report is not as expansive as it could be, it does show that many of the
largest lobbyists and spenders in support of the AIA are in fact large, international
corporations. While this does not necessarily mean the law will hurt small businesses, it does shed light on who expects the greatest benefit.
F. AIA Mitigating Effects on Small Businesses
Small businesses are not the only entities that realize the harmful effects of
the first-to-file provision, as the drafters of the AIA drafted provisions that attempted to mitigate the obvious harmful effects and disadvantages it puts on small entities.
The most obvious part of the AIA recognizing the harmful effect it will have
on small entities is found in the language of the AIA itself, assuring that Congress
and the new patent system “should promote industries to continue to develop new
technologies that spur growth and create jobs across the country which includes
protecting the rights of small businesses and inventors from predatory behavior
that could result in the cutting off of innovation.”198 While this text displays an
honorable intent, the passing of the AIA itself will cause this predatory behavior
that “could” result in the cutting off of innovation.
The AIA requires the USPTO to conduct a “study on implementation” which
requires the Director to report to Congress after conducting a four year study regarding “the manner in which this Act and the amendments made by this Act are
being implemented” and on other aspects “with respect to patent rights, innovation
to the United States, competitiveness of the United States markets, access by small
businesses to capital for investment, and such other issues. . . .”199 This provision
explicitly recognizes that there may be harmful effects on our economy, innovativeness, and small businesses.
A further study that the AIA requires the USPTO to conduct is intended to determine how the Office “can best help small businesses with international patent
protection. . . .”200 This report is due 120 days after the date of enactment of the
AIA and the Director shall let Congress know his determination of whether a fund
loan program, grant program, or neither should be established as well as giving any
recommendations the Director may have. 201
Another commonly cited provision by proponents of the AIA with respect to
the effects on small businesses is the provision establishing the “micro-entity” category.202 The AIA has several different ways to qualify as a “micro-entity.”203
What this small entity classification gives the applicants in this category is a fifty
percent fee reduction for “filing, searching, examining, issuing, appealing, and
maintaining patent applications and patents.”204 The AIA also adds a category for
198. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 30, 125 Stat. 284, 339 (2011)
(emphasis added).
199. Id. § 26(a), (b), 125 Stat. at 338.
200. Id. § 31(a), 125 Stat. at 339.
201. Id. § 31(b), (c), 125 Stat. at 339–40.
202. John Koenig, The America Invents Act is Better for Small Business (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.johnkoenig.com/the-america-invents-act-is-better-for-small-business/.
203. AIA § 10(g), 125 Stat. at 318.
204. Id. § 10(b), 125 Stat. at 316–17.
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applicants now referred to as “micro entities” who get a seventy-five percent reduction in fees.205 This reduction in fees undoubtedly will help small entities, but it still
does not solve the glaring issue of their ability to compete with the pace at which
the larger corporations will be able to file. Moreover, the real expenses involved in
filing a patent application come from the $5,000 to $10,000 in attorney’s fees, not
the $915 it costs a micro entity in fees to file with the USPTO. 206
Two final provisions that seem to have the most hope for small businesses are
found in Sections 28 and 32 of the AIA. Section 28 creates a “Patent Ombudsman
Program for Small Business Concerns,” or, as proponents of the Act call the program, “a champion at the PTO” who looks out for their interests and helps small
businesses secure patents.207 Section 32 of the AIA, institutes a pro bono program
that requires the Director of the PTO to “work with and support intellectual property law associations across the country in the establishment of pro bono programs
designed to assist financially under-resourced independent inventors and small
businesses.”208 This last provision seems to understand that the best way to mitigate
the harmful effects of the first-to-file system imposed by the AIA is to attempt to
level the playing field. If small businesses are able to have proficient counsel at the
beginning of their patent obtaining efforts, it will level the playing field at least
some with the large corporations who have the counsel from the beginning as well.
This, along with other ideas addressed and considered,209 are the types of actions
that need to be made in order to put small businesses on the same playing field as
they were before the passing of the AIA.
V. CONCLUSION
By relocating the fulcrum under the risk-reward balance, the AIA undermines inventors’ and investors’ confidence that undertaking the process of
invention and product development is worthwhile. This will harm early
stage innovation, hurt small business, and “ultimately jeopardize America’s ability to create new jobs.”
Jennifer L. Case210
The signing of the America Invents Act undoubtedly “will speed up the patent
process”211 and harmonize our system with the rest of the world, but at what cost?
Whether the change from first-to-invent to first-to-file “will help American entre205. Id.
206. Brad Fach, How much does it cost to patent an idea?, PATENTFILE.ORG,
http://www.patentfile.org/howmuchdoesitcosttopatentanidea/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
207. AIA § 28; 157 CONG. REC. H4424 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar
Smith).
208. AIA § 32, 125 Stat. at 340.
209. See infra Part V.
210. Case, supra note 11, at 77.
211. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Signs
America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New
Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim.
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preneurs and businesses bring their inventions to market sooner,”212 or if that is
offset by a loss of innovation by the simplification of the priority rules, is a question that can only be answered with time. However, comparing our innovative
economy and patent system to the rest of the world and observing how a similar
change affected Canada, it seems that this change will hurt both innovation and the
chances of small inventors to break into the market. 213 This ability for small inventors to break into the corporate structure is what has long made America unique and
helped great industry innovator’s such as Steve Jobs and Bill Gates emerge. If the
Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of the AIA, despite the numerous arguments against it, small inventors will be the ones that have to find ways to remain competitive and keep in mind ways to cost-effectively maximize their patent
protection.
However, there are some ways that inventors can mitigate the effects of the
AIA themselves, such as simply becoming familiar with the patent process. Applicants can save a lot of time and money with even small amounts of knowledge of
the patent process, such as knowing deadlines to avoid fees and having to get extensions. This will also allow applicants to minimize the roles of their patent firms
or attorneys by allowing them to perform much of the process of filing without the
help of their attorney.
Another very useful tool for applicants to utilize is a provisional patent application. A provisional application allows the filer to establish an initial priority date,
while buying time to raise capital from investors.
While this may be against public policy, one of the best ways to mitigate the
first-to-file system is to move our patent system more towards a trade secret until
one is ready to patent. It is true that one cannot benefit from their invention during
this period of secrecy, but the inventor could continue to perfect their invention and
gain investors until such time that they are ready to file.
Finally, arguably the most realistic way for small inventors to mitigate the
harmful effects of the AIA that they will experience is to utilize Section 32 of the
AIA, which institutes a pro bono program.214 The director of the USPTO will be the
one instituting this program, and not only could this pro bono program utilize intellectual property law associations from across the country to assist small businesses,215 but the program could also successfully enlist the work of second and third
year law students pursuing a career in patent law. Many law students pursuing a
career in patent law have passed the patent bar by their second or third year to make
themselves more attractive to employers. Additionally, many law schools have
mandatory pro bono hours that their students must complete as a prerequisite for
graduation.216 A program enabling law students to contact needy inventors and

212. Id.
213. See supra Part IV.C–D.
214. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 32, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011).
215. Id.
216. ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service, Pro Bono, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/
resources/pro_bono.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
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work under the supervision of experienced patent attorneys to fulfill their pro bono
hours would benefit both groups of people and help mitigate the effects the AIA
will have on small businesses and inventors.
In conclusion, with the passing of the AIA, the burden of trying to stay competitive with the large corporations, who were able to afford lobbying for the Act in
Congress, falls on the small businesses themselves. If the Supreme Court upholds
the provision of the AIA instituting a first-to-file system, despite the language of
the Constitution and 220 years of established law showing first-to-file is unconstitutional, the uniquely American system of patent law that has placed us on the forefront of innovation will be erased and successfully streamline our system and harmonize the U.S. with the rest of the world who has trailed us in innovation. While
the AIA does resolve many of the problems with our current system, it does so in a
way that will also create a new problem: reducing the place for American ingenuity, which has long made the U.S. patent system unique and coveted.
Eric P. Vandenburg*
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